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PICKETING AS AN EXERCISE OF THE RIGHT
OF FREE SPEECH
In Cafeteria Employees Union, Local 302, et al. v. Angelos
et al.' the United States Supreme Court has once more affirmed
the view that the right of members of a labor union to make
public the facts of a labor dispute by peaceful picketing is protected by the Federal Constitution. That the court should so
hold is not of itself surprising. Beginning with Seimn v. Tile
Layers Union,2 the court has said repeatedly that the right of
pickets to solicit public support for their cause cannot be denied
by a state, inasmuch as the right of picketing is embraced within
the constitutional guaranty of freedom of speech.
Although it does not so appear in the instant case, the respondent originally had operated a non-union cafeteria with
the aid of six employees. The petitioner sought to negotiate
with the respondent for the purpose of bringing the employees
under a union contract but was unsuccessful. Thereupon, a
single picket began to patrol the sidewalk in front of the cafeteria, bearing a sign which read, "This place is unfair to organized labor, please help us." It appeared that the pickets
called the proprietor a "fascist" and told patrons that they
were "aiding the cause of fascism."
The court nevertheless
found that the picketing was at all times orderly and peaceful.
One week after the picketing began the respondent entered
into a partnership agreement with his employees, conforming,
so far as appears, to the laws of the state of New York governing such agreements. Application for an injunction restraining the picketing was then made. The injunction was granted
restraining the picketing at or near the respondent's place of
business, and this decree was affirmed by the New York Court of
Appeals, three judges dissenting.3 In reversing the decree of the
state court the doctrine of the Senn Case was applied. In effect,
the court said that a labor union may picket an establishment,
notwithstanding the absence of an employer-employee relationship therein and though no labor dispute is involved. For the
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S301 U. S. 468, 57 S. Ct. 857, 81 L. Ed. 1229 (1937).
'Angelos et al. v. Mesevich et al., 289 N. Y. 498, 46 N. E. (2d)
903 (1943).
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purpose of its decision the court accepted the finding of the trial
court that the respondent's business was conducted without
employees. Under the terms of this decision, it would appear
that a restaurant, for example, conducted by a husband and
wife, with no outside help, might be picketed on the refusal of
the proprietors to join a union or to conform in some other manner to the demands of the union. The possibility of grave oppression and injustice is apparent when it is remembered that
today an increasing percentage of the working population belongs to unions and among union members it is an almost unwritten law that a picket line will not be crossed by them, regardless of the merits of the particular controversy; thus, in
the case of an individual operating his own business upon
slender capital picketing, though peaceful and for but a short
period, may well spell ruin.
The instant decision represents the ultimate extension of
the doctrine that the court announced in the Sein Case, namely,
that the members of a union need no special statutory authority
from a state in order to make known by picketing the facts of
a labor dispute, and, conversely, may not be denied that privilege by any state, inasmuch as the right is protected by the
Constitution. The fallacy inherent in this view results from the
fact that, practically speaking, a union is permitted to make
a unilateral determination that a labor dispute exists, whereupon the right to picket attaches, even though the persons it
assumes to protect are satisfied with their lot, and even if there
are no employees at all.
In the Senn Case 4 the union sought to compel the proprietor
of a small contracting business to sign a union contract. The
proprietor himself did a substantial part of the work and from
time to time employed one or two workers, the number employed
depending upon his need for additional help. The union contract
provided that the employer could not himself do any work but
must hire union members to do all of it. To sign such a contract would be disastrous to the business as he was then conducting it, compelling him to forego the fruits of his own labor.
Because of the employer's unwillingness to sign the contract
containing that provision and the refusal of the union to delete
it, pickets were stationed about the place of business. In holding
'Supra, note 2.
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that the activity of the union was protected by the guarantee of
free speech and could not be enjoined, the equally basic right
of the employer to work with his own hands was rejected. While
there was an employer-employee relationship here, the fact that
the employees were content with the terms of their employment
did not affect the right of the union to picket. In American
Federation of Labor v. Swing,5 a labor union attempted to
unionize the employees of a beauty shop and employed picketing
to attain that end. Here again, though the employees were
themselves satisfied, the court held that the picketing could not
be enjoined. That the right to picket peacefully cannot be
denied is even more emphatically affirmed in the case of Ncw
Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery Co., Inc." There a food
store, which employed only white persons was opened in a
colored district, and the New Negro Alliance, an organization of
colored people, caused a picket to patrol in front of the store,
bearing a sign which read, "Do Your Part! Buy Where You
Can Work! No Negroes Employed Here!" in an effort to compel the employment of colored persons in the store. The eourt
held this to be an exercise of the right of free speech beyond the
power of a court to enjoin. This further reveals the court's
conception of the broad scope to be given to the free speech
guaranty.
A further illustration of the oppression to which an individual may be subjected under the immunity accorded union
picketing by the decisions of the Supreme Court is to be found
in Glover v. Minneapolis Building Trades Coulncil.7

In that

case a building contractor erected houses for sale, employing
only union labor. The contractor himself was a licensed and
competent sheet metal worker, and as such, he sometimes installed furnaces in the houses he built. The union of sheet metal
workers, who performed the work of furnace installation in
312 U. S. 321, 61 S. Ct. 568, 85 L. Ed. 855 (1940).
6303 U. S. 552, 58 S. Ct 703, 82 L. Ed. 1012 (1938).

It should be

pointed out, perhaps, that some ground exists for distinguishing this
case from other cases where the right to picket has been sustained,
though the employees of the picketed establishment were satisfied.
It might be argued that the interest of the Alliance in securing opportunity for members of their race brought their activities within
the constitutional guarantee of free speech and that picketing was
their mode of publicizing the facts of this particular discrimination
against members of theirirace. _
'-

Minn. -,

10 N. W. (2d) 481 (1943).

PICKETING-THE RIGHT OF FREE SPEECH

that community, demanded that the contractor employ union
members to install furnaces instead of performing the work
himself, and upon his refusal to do so, a picket line was established about the house he was then building. Thereupon, the
union carpenters refused to cross the picket line, thereby bringing the construction work to a standstill, though they themselves
had no grievance. In holding that it had no power to enjoin the
picketing, the state court expressly stated that the decisions of
the Supreme Court in the Sein Case and in Bakery & Pastry
Dricers & Helpers Local 802 v. Woht s were being followed.
In all of the preceding cases the Supreme Court consistently
adhered to the view that picketing, being an exercise of free
speech, was not dependent upon the existence of any labor dispute between an employer and his employees. The right of a
union to picket an employer's place of business came into existence whenever the union determined that its interests required
this form of coercion. So long as the picketing is carried on
peacefully, and an interest of organized labor is concerned the
determination of the union as to the necessity therefor is conclusive upon the employer, his employees and the public generally.
In the light of these decisions it was not surprising that the
court should go one step further and say that the guarantee of
free speech rendered inviolate even that picketing which was
directed against an establishment having no employees at all.
Vrhether the framers of the Constitution ever intended that the
right of free speech should have such primacy over other equally
fundamental rights may well be questioned.
That the right freely to disseminate ideas is basic and inalienable, subject to certain reasonable limitations, under the
Constitution, will not be questioned. It will be conceded, fur315 U. S. 769, 62 S. Ct. 816, 86 L. Ed. 1178 (1941). In this case
a bakery sold its products to deliverymen who in turn sold the baked
goods to retailers, keeping the difference between the price at which
they bought and sold as their remuneration. The union desired the
deliverymen to work shorter hours and hire a union member to work
one day each week. Picketing of the bakery to enforce the union's
demands upon the deliverymen was held to be non-enjoinable, since
the Fourteenth Amendment protected such activity. The Court
said, ". . . one need not be in a 'labor dispute' as defined by state
law to have a right under the Fourteenth Amendment to express a
grievance in a labor dispute by publication unattended by violence,
coercion, or conduct otherwise unlawful or oppressive."
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ther, that the display by a striking employee of a placard upon
which labor's view of a controversy is set forth is an exercise of
free speech, and that to hold otherwise might well rob the worker
of his most potent weapon for the enforcement of his rights
against an employer with superior resources. It is quite another
matter, however, to say that a labor union has an inalienable
right to picket a business which has no employees for whom it
could speak, on the ground that such activity is an exercise of a
constitutional prerogative. 9 It would seem that the right of a
small business man, who alone or with the aid of his family, conducts his establishment without outside labor, to be free from
the economic coercion of a union is as fundamental as is the
right to freedom of speech.
It is submitted, therefore, that the doctrine of that line of
cases, 10 of which this is the latest, holding peaceful picketing
to be an exercise of the constitutional prerogative of free speech,
which no state may interfere with or restrain in any way, should
be re-examined and modified to take into account the inalienable
right of free men to be self-employed upon such terms as may
appear wise to themselves alone.
LEO OXLEY

9

Supra, note 8, at 86 L. Ed. 1183.
" Bakery & Pastry Drivers and Helpers, Local 802 of Int.
Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Wohl, 315 U. S. 769, 62 S. Ct. 816, 86
L. Ed. 1178 (1941); American Federation of Labor v. Swing, 312
U. S. 321, 61 S. Ct. 568, 85 L. Ed. 855 (1940); Milk Wagon Drivers
Union of Chicago, Local 753 v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 312 U. S.
287, 61 S. Ct. 568, 85 L. Ed. 836 (Dictum) (1940); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88, 60 S. Ct. 736, 84 L. Ed. 1093 (1939); New Negro
Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery Co., Inc., 303 U. S. 552, 58 S. Ct. 703, 82
L. Ed. 1012 (1938); Senn v. Tile Layers Union, 301 U S. 468, 57 S. Ct.
857, 81 L. Ed. 1229 (1937). The following New York cases also
uphold the right of a labor union to picket: J. H. & S. Theatres, Inc.
v. Fay, 260 N. Y. 315, 183 N. E. 509 (1932); Stillwell Theatres v.
Kaplan, 259 N. Y. 405, 182 N. E. 63 (1932); Exchange Bakery &
Restaurant, Inc. v. Rifkin, 245 N. Y. 260, 157 N. E. 130 (1927).

